Reform or Regression? The Battle for Diaspora Voting Rights
Diaspora Edition, July 4th 2025
Before diving into this special edition, I want to begin with a brief note. It's been a few weeks since my last edition, and part of that silence reflects a growing disillusionment—one I suspect many of you share.
Despite the tireless efforts of ministers working with les moyens de bord to salvage the country's image, we’re still circling around the core issue on which everything else hinges: disarmament. Since my last piece—"Motion Without Mouvement"—there’s been no meaningful development. I'm holding off on the next Karometer until there’s more to report. But let’s be honest: at some point, lack of movement becomes regression. And it's time we start admitting that.
We are once again in paralysis. And the essence of that paralysis—our democracy—is broken. Nowhere is this more evident than in our parliament. And perhaps the clearest case in point is the handling of diaspora voting rights.
As someone who has followed Lebanon’s political evolution and as a member of the National Bloc—a party whose majority of members are abroad—I’ve seen firsthand how the diaspora has quietly become one of Lebanon’s most powerful democratic forces. In 2022, Lebanese abroad didn’t just vote—they reshaped parliament, brought in new faces, and proved that distance doesn’t diminish democratic engagement.
But that power is now under threat. Despite overwhelming parliamentary support, a critical amendment to secure permanent diaspora voting rights was left off this week’s parliamentary agenda. With August recess approaching and registration deadlines looming, we’re facing a moment that could determine whether hundred of thousands Lebanese abroad maintain meaningful political voice—or get sidelined into tokenism.
I'm writing this because the window for action is closing fast—and the diaspora needs to understand both what's at stake and what we can do about it.
📌 In this newsletter, you'll discover:
Why the June 30th parliamentary session was a missed opportunity that can't happen again
The three major misconceptions confusing diaspora voting debates
How Lebanese abroad proved their electoral power in 2022—and why it scares traditional politicians
What the proposed "6-seat system" would actually mean (spoiler: no one really knows)
Next steps for diaspora communities before it's too late
The Missed Opportunity That Can't Happen Again
Despite overwhelming support from 65+ MPs across party lines and sustained media pressure, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri chose not to include the diaspora voting rights amendment on Monday June 30th's parliamentary agenda. This wasn't just a procedural delay—it was a deliberate missed chance to secure fundamental democratic rights for over one million Lebanese citizens living abroad.
Every week of delay reduces our chances of extending the registration period for 2026 elections and increases the likelihood we'll be stuck with either a broken 6-seat system or another temporary patch that merely delays the problem for four more years.
The diaspora has already proven its electoral power: in 2022, Lebanese abroad made up 6% of the electorate with a remarkable 63% turnout—higher than the 48% inside Lebanon. Their votes decided at least seven parliamentary seats, five of which went to anti-establishment candidates. But this is just the beginning—with growing diaspora registration and continued high turnout, their influence could reshape dozens more seats in 2026 if they maintain the right to vote for all 128 MPs. This unlimited potential for change is precisely what the political establishment fears, which is why they're pushing to contain diaspora influence within just six reserved seats. Now that transformative power hangs in the balance.
The August Deadline Crisis
👉🏼 What Actually Happened Monday: Despite months of advocacy by diaspora groups, media coverage highlighting the issue's urgency, and a rare cross-sectarian coalition of 65+ MPs endorsing the amendment, Speaker Berri simply didn't put the draft law on the parliamentary agenda. No explanation. No postponement announcement. Just silence.
👉🏼 The Closing Window: Parliament typically goes on summer recess in August, leaving minimal session time before MPs scatter across Lebanon and abroad for vacation. Each passing week makes it less likely that:
The registration period for 2026 voting can be extended from the current inadequate 1.5 months to a reasonable 6 months
A permanent solution can be reached before reverting to problematic alternatives
Two Bad Scenarios If We Fail:
Worst case: Revert to the unworkable 6-seat system that treats the entire diaspora as a single electoral district spanning six continents
Temporary fix: Another short-term amendment like 2018 and 2022, which just delays addressing fundamental problems for four more years
The political momentum exists—65+ MPs from across the political landscape (minus Hezbollah, Amal, and the Free Patriotic Movement) have endorsed the amendment. What's missing is the parliamentary session to actually debate and vote on it.
Clearing Up the Confusion: What "Voting for 128" Actually Means
👉🏼 There are three major misconceptions that keep surfacing in discussions about diaspora voting rights. Let's address them directly:
Misconception #1: "The diaspora wants to vote for all 128 individual MPs"
Reality: We vote for MPs in our LOCAL registration district only—just like Lebanese residents do. If you're registered in Beirut I, you vote for Beirut I candidates. If you're from Tripoli, you vote for Tripoli candidates. We're not asking for 128 different ballots—we're asking to vote in our home constituency from abroad, exactly as we did successfully in 2018 and 2022.
Misconception #2: "But France has expat MPs, so why shouldn't Lebanon?"
The crucial difference: French expat MPs exist to handle consular services and French citizens' needs abroad—visa issues, embassy services, expatriate social security. Lebanese abroad don't need Lebanese MPs to help them navigate life in France or Australia. We have those countries' systems for that.
👉🏼 What we DO need is for Lebanon itself to be fixed. Lebanese diaspora sends over $7 billion annually in remittances to Lebanon—we're investors in Lebanon's future, not clients needing services abroad.
Compare this to Albania, which recently implemented diaspora voting reform in 2025: Albanian citizens abroad vote for their home districts, not separate expat seats. Other countries like Croatia, Romania, and Italy have similar systems where diaspora citizens vote for their home constituencies, not separate "diaspora MPs." Lebanon's proposed reform aligns with these international best practices.
Misconception #3: "At least the 6-seat proposal gives the diaspora representation"
The reality: There's no concrete plan for how this would actually work. We know it would supposedly allocate "one seat per main religious confession" (Sunnis, Chias, Greek Orthodox, Maronites, Greek Catholic and Druze). But how would geographical distribution work? How do you campaign for a "North America seat" or "Europe seat"?
The 6-seat system creates what experts call a "hybrid electoral district spanning six continents"—making candidate campaigns virtually impossible and voter choice meaningless. It's not representation; it's tokenism designed to contain diaspora influence.
Why the 6-Seat System is Fundamentally Broken
Geographic Impossibility
Imagine trying to run for "the Europe seat" or "the North America seat." How do you campaign across dozens of countries, multiple time zones, and vastly different Lebanese community sizes? A candidate would need to be in London, Paris, Berlin, Stockholm, and Brussels in the same week, then fly to Montreal, Detroit, Boston, and Los Angeles. The logistics alone make meaningful campaigning impossible.
Vague and Unworkable Formula
The proposal mentions "one MP per main religious sect," but Lebanon has 18 recognized confessions. Which six get representation? How are Chia voters (for example) in Australia supposed to connect with "their" MP who might be campaigning primarily in Africa? The entire framework lacks basic operational details.
Taxpayer-Funded Global Tourism
These six MPs would need to spend substantial time traveling across continents to meet constituents. While Lebanese schools lack heating and public hospitals shortage medicine, we'd be funding MPs to constantly travel between São Paulo, Sydney, Dubai, Detroit, Paris, and Lagos. Lebanon's parliament already struggles with functionality—adding this travel circus would make things worse.
Constitutional Contradiction
The 6-seat system would give diaspora citizens residence-based voting rights while denying the same to Lebanese residents, who must vote in their registration district regardless of where they actually live. This creates a two-tier citizenship system with constitutional and logical inconsistency.
The Diaspora's Proven Electoral Power: From Sidelines to Kingmakers
The 2018 Baseline
When diaspora voting was first introduced in 2018, approximately 82,000 Lebanese abroad registered to vote, representing just 3% of the electorate. Their political impact was minimal—they voted largely for traditional parties and didn't determine any seats. The political establishment wasn't worried.
The 2022 Transformation
Everything changed in 2022. Registration surged to 225,624, —nearly tripling in four years. More importantly, 63% of registered diaspora voters actually voted, compared to just 48% turnout inside Lebanon. This wasn't just higher participation—it was a fundamentally different kind of political engagement.
Game-Changing Results
The numbers tell the story of political transformation:
👉🏼 Diaspora vs. Domestic Voting Patterns (2022):
Anti-establishment candidates: 34% diaspora support vs. 11% domestic
Lebanese Forces: 20% diaspora vs. 10% domestic
Hezbollah: 8% diaspora vs. 19% domestic
Amal Movement: 5% diaspora vs. 11% domestic
The diaspora didn't just vote differently—they voted decisively. Their ballots determined at least seven parliamentary seats, with five going to anti-establishment candidates. In tight races across Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North Lebanon, a few hundred votes from Paris, Sydney, or Detroit often provided the margin of victory.
7 seats was just the starting point, not a ceiling and the 6-seat system is specifically designed to cap their influence.
Political Parties: Winners and Losers Abroad
Winners: Anti-establishment forces saw their diaspora support surge from 6% in 2018 to 34% in 2022. Lebanese Forces maintained strong diaspora support, especially in Australia, North America, and France.
Losers: Free Patriotic Movement collapsed from 16% to 7% diaspora support. Amal Movement dropped from 11% to 5%. Tashnag saw massive diaspora losses. Future Movement's absence left a vacuum in traditional Sunni diaspora strongholds.
Global Variations: Context Shaped Choices
The diaspora isn't monolithic—voting patterns varied significantly by country:
🇦🇪UAE (72% turnout): Anti-establishment candidates won 56% of votes—the highest globally.
🇫🇷France (71% turnout): Nearly half voted for anti-establishment candidates.
🇺🇸🇨🇦US & Canada: Lebanese Forces and reformists competed neck-and-neck, while FPM support collapsed.
🇩🇪🇳🇬Germany & Africa: Traditional parties, especially Hezbollah and Amal, maintained stronger support.
🇦🇺Australia: An older diaspora with many from North Lebanon showed strong LF support but minimal anti-establishment gains.
The Political Elite's Nervous Response
Lebanon's diaspora has been politically sidelined for decades despite being millions strong and sending over $7 billion annually in remittances. But since 2018, they've emerged as a force that can't be ignored. The 2022 surge sent a clear message: it's ready to shape Lebanon's political future.
This electoral awakening comes as migration has dramatically accelerated. Between 2018 and 2023, the average annual migration was around 78,000 people, compared to 25,000 before 2019. In 2022 alone, 55,000 left Lebanon. In 2023, that number exceeded 150,000. These aren't emigrants cutting ties with Lebanon—they're forced migrants maintaining deep connections to home.
This is especially true for Lebanese in the GCC region, who live with one foot in Lebanon and one foot abroad. They commute regularly between their workplaces and their families and investments in Lebanon. They're not distant observers—they're active economic participants who pump millions into Lebanon's economy, support extended families, invest in real estate, and maintain businesses.
When someone sends $50,000 annually in remittances, owns property, employs people in their hometown, and visits six times a year, do they deserve less political voice than someone who lives in Lebanon? The idea that these vital economic actors should be limited to six symbolic seats while having no say in the 128 MPs who govern the country they're financially sustaining is not just undemocratic—it's economically absurd.
The Current Proposed Solution
The proposed changes in the draft law would:
Permanent home district voting: Eliminate the six-seat concept and permanently allow diaspora to vote in their registration districts for the full 128 MPs
Extended registration period: Expand registration from the current inadequate 1.5 months to six months (May 20 - November 20 of the pre-election year)
Lower polling thresholds: Reduce required registered voters per polling station from 200 to 100
Diplomatic mission flexibility: Count all accredited missions in a country as one electoral center for threshold calculations
What Success Looks Like
👉🏼 If passed, this would make permanent the successful system used in 2018 and 2022—but with improvements that make registration more accessible and voting more convenient. No more debates every four years. No more temporary patches. Just stable, democratic participation for Lebanese citizens regardless of where they live.
What's Next: Two Paths Forward
Path 1: Success Through Pressure
If sustained advocacy convinces Speaker Berri to schedule a parliamentary session before August with the draft law on the agenda, the amendment could pass quickly given its broad support. This would secure permanent diaspora voting rights and extended registration periods for 2026.
Path 2: Temporary Measures and Future Fights
If the permanent amendment fails, advocacy must shift to ensuring any temporary extension (like 2018 and 2022) maintains home district voting rather than reverting to the 6-seat system. This would preserve diaspora influence while setting up another fight in 2030.
The Registration Timeline Reality
👉🏼 Regardless of which path emerges, Lebanese abroad should begin preparing for 2026 registration. Under current law, the window could be as short as October-November 2025. Every month of delay in parliamentary action reduces the time available for diaspora mobilization.
The Bottom Line
Lebanon's diaspora has evolved from political observers to electoral kingmakers. In 2022, they proved that distance doesn't diminish democratic engagement—it often enhances it. Free from clientelism networks and motivated by genuine desire for reform, diaspora voters rewarded accountability and punished stagnation.
The question isn't whether Lebanon can afford to let its diaspora vote meaningfully. The question is whether it can afford not to. This isn't just about electoral mechanics—it's about whether Lebanon will embrace the democratic energy of its global citizens or try to contain it behind artificial barriers.
The political momentum exists. The precedent is proven. The need is urgent.
The only thing missing is parliamentary action—and that requires our voices, our pressure, and our refusal to accept anything less than full democratic participation.
Time is running out. Lebanon's diaspora has shown it can change parliament. Now we need to change the law that lets us do it.
Very good points Kristy -and goals!
Very solid explanation - thank you Kristy!